




IN DEFENSE OF RICŒUR’S HERMENEUTIC INTERPRETATION 
OF FREUD’S PSYCHOANALYSIS  




Abstract: This paper re-examines the phenomenological-hermeneutical 
interpretation of psychoanalysis debate, presenting and defending Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation. Hermeneutical interpretation of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, particularly that of Freud’s notion of the unconscious, is often taken 
to be bounded to linguistic representation without any direct access of self-
knowledge. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption 
in favour of the phenomenological interpretation (or precisely Henry’s 
interpretation), but that a careful study of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation 
suggests that it can avoid the criticisms and objections raised by its competitors. (1) 
I characterize Henry’s phenomenological interpretation of Freud’s unconscious to 
his criticism of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis, (2) I 
present a defence of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation in terms of two central 
arguments (the twofold language argument and non-reductionist argument), (3) I 
respond to a number of influential objections to Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
interpretation, and (4) I sketch a proposal to the reconciliation of phenomenology 
and hermeneutics.  
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Ricœur’s hermeneutic interpretation of Freud’s psychoanalysis is regarded by 
many philosophers as an old-fashioned view that can be easily discarded. 
Among its many weaknesses, it is said to be bound to a representation (for 
the presupposition of symbolism as the indispensable medium of self-
knowledge), an inaccurate reading of Freud (for the destruction of Freud’s 
project) and a plagiarism of Lacan’s idea (for the similar emphasis of 
linguistic role in Freud’s psychoanalysis). Despite these (and other) charges,  
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I argue that Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is not at all in the sorry 
state that its many critics suppose. On the contrary, Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
interpretation is a robust and powerful explanatory framework for 
understanding Freud as well as reconciling phenomenology and 
hermeneutics. The interpretation has not yet received much attention by 
psychoanalytic readers for many years, attacking by several unsympathetic or 
even hostile readers. Clearly, a full defence of Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
interpretation would require a detailed examination of a wide range of 
competing interpretation and all original texts written by Freud, something I 
cannot do here. What I propose instead is a defence how and why Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation can avoid the phenomenological challenge 
raised by Henry.  
In section two, I argue for the orientation in how to think about the 
phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis debate. 
The debate is not simply about whether a phenomenological interpretation or 
a hermeneutical interpretation is the best approach. Rather it should be 
understood in terms of the focal point of the disagreement between 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, namely, the representation character of 
the unconscious underlying the hermeneutical interpretation and the direct 
presentation of the unconscious underlying the phenomenological 
interpretation. In section three, I present two key clarifications of Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation, focusing on two arguments against Henry’s 
criticism: the twofold language argument and the non-reductionist argument. 
In section four, I respond to some influential objections to Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation, I argue that none of these objections are 
successfully undermine the philosophical significance of Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation. Some of the objections misunderstand Ricœur’s 
aim of re-reading Freud, while other ignore Ricœur’s works with some 
unexamined prejudices. Last but least, I conclude with some remarks on the 
symbolism behind Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation. Ricœur’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology has long been expelled by orthodox 
phenomenological interpretation of Freud in the past. The intent of this paper 
is to convey why it is also likely to have a reconciliation between the two in 
the future.  
 
 
Reorientating the phenomenological-hermeneutic interpretation of 
psychoanalysis debate  
The contemporary phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of 
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psychoanalysis debate is related to the under thematized dialogues between 
Henry and Ricœur. The debate is exclusively concerned with questions about 
the project and the approach of Freud’s psychoanalysis broadly construed (the 
methodology, the unconscious, the conscious, intentionality, and so on). 
Historically, similar concerns were addressed by scholars such as Jacques 
Derrida and Rudolf Bernet. From the perspective of a dialogue, however, 
arguing for a particular method is one thing and reconciling two approaches 
is another. In principle, Bernet argued for the phenomenological approach,  
 
In my view, the best approach to this task is phenomenology and its 
“zigzag” movement between the description and conceptualization of 
phenomena, which it has elevated to the dignity of a philosophical 
method.1  
 
But even if Bernet offered several arguments for the phenomenological 
approach, is only the phenomenological approach the best philosophical 
method? How should we understand the phenomenological approach of 
psychoanalysis? Undeniably, Bernet also recognized the possibility of 
hermeneutical approach, but he remained open and uncertain if 
psychoanalysis is a hermeneutics of symptoms and delusions.2 Derrida 
alternatively pointed out that the hermeneutical method cannot be dismissed 
because «a rule of hermeneutical method that still seems to me valid for the 
historian of philosophy as well as for the psychoanalyst»3. A rule of 
hermeneutical method is to dig deeper from the surface meaning to the hidden 
meaning by destabilizing the authority of canonical interpretation. It is not 
uncommon to hear that phenomenology and hermeneutics are two different 
approaches, and the two approaches are mutually exclusively from each other 
in relation to their interpretations of Freud’s psychoanalysis. This can be 
traced back to Henry’s negative comment to Ricœur’s philosophical reading 
of Freud in The Genealogy of Psychology:  
 
[Ricœur] is one of the few to deal philosophically with Freud, Ricœur 
operates on presuppositions radically different from ours: the symbolic 
universe is the indispensable medium for self-knowledge, which can 
 
1 Rudolf Bernet, Force, Drive, Desire: A Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, Northwestern 
University Press, Evanston 2020, p. 139. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Jacques Derrida, Resistance: On Psychoanalysis. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press 1989, 74. 
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only be hermeneutics. In this way, the rights of intentional 
consciousness are saved. Affect itself has meaning only insofar as it is 
bound to a representation4.  
 
According to Henry, there are two essential differences between his 
phenomenological interpretation and Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation. 
First, Ricœur presupposed that affect itself can only be symbolized and it 
cannot be directly known. But Henry rejects the symbolic universe as the 
indispensable medium. Therefore, Henry’s phenomenological approach 
insists the direct access of intentional consciousness (or unconsciousness) 
without any medium. The first difference is closely related to the second, in 
Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation, self-knowledge is no longer self-
knowledge but is bound to a representation, but it is not the same case in 
Henry’s phenomenological interpretation.  
To understand Henry’s criticism, we have to see how he argued for the 
direct access of intentional consciousness (unconsciousness) without any 
representation. He began with a phenomenological interpretation of 
existential anxiety. Anxiety is the feeling of being, as life. It is «the feeling of 
Self»5. It is the feeling of not being able to escape oneself, where the self is 
essentially constituted by precisely that impossibility. Henry state that the 
phenomenological experience of that inability is anxiety. Anxiety “is 
unemployed libido”. He elaborates that,  
What is unemployed libido? It is repressed libido. But a repressed libido 
is not, for all that, excluded. It does not fall out of an experience. Quite the 
opposite,  
 
and here the theory of repression of affects we have been defining is 
striking confirmed: repressed libido is libido whose self-experiencing 
is taken to the extreme, to the point of being unsupportable… So, 
anxiety, at the very heart of suffering and its increase, is nothing but the 
feeling of not being able to escape itself 6. 
 
Repression is posited as a process immanent to and identical with 
phenomenological life: The motive and purpose of repression is nothing else 
than the avoidance of unpleasure or pain. In a large extent, repression hides 
 
4 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychology, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1993, p. 
349. 
5 Ivi, p. 312. 
6 Ivi, pp. 312-313. 
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the anxiety. Nevertheless, repression itself is not an anxiety before a real 
external danger or an object. Repression does not indicate the feeling of 
anxiety (the feeling of the impossibility or inability to escape from anxiety) 
but signifies the existential anxiety as the existential state of someone who is 
repressed (the impossibility or inability of escaping from the feeling). This 
signification is the ontological necessity of a state that one must feel, and one 
must be affected. It is “the facticity of an agent”.7 If you are alive (life), then 
it is a necessity for you to “be” anxiety. In Henry’s phenomenological 
interpretation, Freud’s theory of repression is not about the psychological 
feeling but a philosophy of existence or a philosophy of life. A philosophy of 
existence or a philosophy of life discusses the notion of life. It has two 
important definitions:  
 
(1) It is the ultimate foundation of Being.8  
(2) It is being itself, the original hyperpower or the Archi-Body.9  
 
According to Henry, life’s essence is a power of self-affection, self-showing, 
and self-appearance.  
 
The self-affection shows the state of oneself without any specific act of 
conceptualization or objectification. The essence of the power is the 
sufficient and necessary condition for any modes of being, e.g., 
representing, knowing, hearing… all kinds of activities. As a result, any 
conceptualized or objectified representation is then derived from life. 
Life can present itself by and through itself. It does not need to be 
represent itself through a specific act of grasping, so he offered a 
phenomenological interpretation of Freud in a non-representation way. 
The essential question in Freudianism concerning the reciprocal 
transformation of consciousness into the conscious and vice versa now 
gets a completely different solution: from being possible, it becomes 
absolutely impossible.10  
 
In Henry’s phenomenological approach, the unconscious reveals itself, and 
with it a glimpse of “the original meaning of the unconscious”. Henry draws 
resources from Husserl’s phenomenology of meaning that “the positing agent 
 
7 Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, Nijhoff, The Hague 1973, pp. 645-666 
8 Ivi, p. 41. 
9 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychology, cit., p. 325. 
10 Ivi, p. 294. 
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itself is precisely the power to posit meanings, a Sinngebung, a 
consciousness”11. A consciousness as the positing agent is the “playground” 
or the field of meaning constitution. For example, the meaning of the word 
dog designates as its own ideality, because the noematic correlate of a 
signifying intentionality originally creates that meaning.  
Taking a dream content as another example, a dream content is produced 
by the unconscious tendency. There is neither meaning nor a signifying 
(meaning) consciousness in the process of producing dream content by an 
unconscious tendency, and «therefore there is no “meaning” in the linguistic 
sense»12. 
The being itself or the life itself has no word-meaning that is created by 
the specific art of pure thought as Sinngebung. Henry’s doctrine of being 
itself, life itself, the original hyperpower or the Archi-Body is an exceptional 
case of hermeneutic reading which cannot be understood and expressed 
through language. For him, «it is impossible to distance oneself from them, 
as affection as self-affection never stops»13. Linguistic articulation always 
involves distinction. For example, the basic English Grammar is S is P 
(Subject-Verb-Predicate). “I am happy” this linguistic expression 
differentiates ‘I’ and ‘happy’ and disrupts the self-affection and self-showing. 
Thus, when Freud declared that everything has meaning without “reducing 
the psychical to something expressible”, he opened the domain in which there 
is “no intentionality or meaning” instead14. Freud’s project of psychoanalysis 
is thus not based on any representation, but it radicalizes the psychical to non-
expressible.  
Only a radical phenomenology can recognize the essential dichotomy of 
the unconscious, as it takes its concrete accomplishment (non-expressible) 
into account. Moreover, only such a phenomenology takes its immediate 
feeling or affect into account, his phenomenological interpretation of Freud 
is then possible to allow the conscious and unconscious life constituting itself 
in and through itself. In contrast, hermeneutics is a thought of the mediation. 
To know what we are, they always take a detour: either our true being is 
mediately constituted, or our knowledge of it is mediate. Psychoanalysis was 
in complete agreement when it aims at catching our secret of being: «all these 
 
11 Ivi, p. 295. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Ivi, p. 308. 
14 Ivi, p. 296. 
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indications are sacrificed to a hermeneutic reading»15.  
 
 
Two key clarifications of Ricœur’s hermeneutic interpretation  
Phenomenologist like Henry may not accept representation and may instead 
opt for the direct access of intentional consciousness. But he must explain 
how the hidden meaning is uncovered through the description of symptoms. 
Bernet has clearly been aware of this “zigzag” movement between the 
description and conceptualization of phenomena. As Lacan, Ricœur and 
Bernet once noted, the zigzag movement allows psychoanalysis to distinguish 
itself from the empirical sciences16. Psychoanalysis, in this way, not only 
crystallizes psychical phenomena, but it also demystifies them. It pays 
attention to the meaning rather than the empirical description only. This 
distinction is significant, as the unconscious cannot be empirically observed. 
We cannot directly see or observe how the unconscious is given as a 
meaningful unity. The recognition of the unconscious as a meaningful unity 
is based upon the psychoanalytic technique, which involves the hermeneutic 
dialectics. Therefore, in Ricœur’s view, Freud’s project can be along with the 
line of hermeneutics that «the reality of the unconscious is constituted in and 
by hermeneutics in an epistemological and transcendental sense»17. But bear 
in mind, Ricœur does not limit himself to the investigation of the unconscious 
in the dimension of representation only.  
 
The most convincing argument to clarify hermeneutical interpretation is 
what I called the twofold language argument. Ricœur distinguishes symbols 
and signs. Symbols have double meanings, where signs have a single 
meaning. Symbols can mean bound to or bound by. “Bound to” refers to its 
surface and literal meanings; whereas “bound by” refers to the hidden 
meanings ‘resides’ in the symbolic meanings. The latter is called “the 
revealing power of symbol”, which is opposite to signs. In contrast, signs 
merely signify what is posted in them, so they can be formalized and reduced 
to “an object of exchange”18. According to Ricœur, “the unconscious” is a 
symbol, hiding the meaning of one’s own pre-reflective and pre-theoretical 
 
15 Ivi, p. 325. 
16 Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Norton & Company, 
New York 1978. 
17 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy. University Press, Yale 1970, p. 106. 
18 Ivi, p. 31. 
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living experience, because the symbolism of the unconscious “can always 
spring back to life”19. He further distinguished the twofold language of the 
unconscious:  
(1) The unconscious in the language of force and  
(2) The unconscious in the language of meaning.  
Both refer to “the unconscious”, which are the conscious counterparts. Yet 
the unconscious in the language of force indicates the non-representable life 
and its essence. Conversely, the unconscious in the language of meaning 
refers to “representations” of life.20 The former cannot be exhausted by any 
conceptualization or representation, so what is more, the former can only be 
appropriated by the latter.  
Based on the first clarification, the most convincing argument clarifying 
hermeneutical interpretation and defending from Henry’s criticism is the non-
reductionist argument. As Ricœur noted explicitly, that “the language of force 
can never be overcome by the language of meaning”21. The unconscious has 
undergone “transformation (Umsetzung)” or “translation (Uebersetzung)” 
into something conscious22. Nevertheless, this transformation or translation 
does not replace or reduce the unconscious into the conscious, as the 
unconscious displaces itself through the process. Thus, it is not a “reduction 
to consciousness”, but a “reduction of consciousness”23. In the replacement 
with the dialectic, there would only be relations of signifier to signified, which 
would be symbolized by S/s. In the displacement with the dialectic, a new 
signifier S’ replaces the former S, while the former S continues on as a latent 
signifier. Therefore, the symbolic form is S’/S x S/s. After the two dialectical 
moments, the same element S is at the same time both signifier and signified, 
a situation for which there is “no linguistic parallel”24. This symbolic form 
offers the possibility of double interpretation, as it has the close element, 
namely the relations of signifier to signifier, on the one hand; it remains the 
open element, namely a latent signifier. The new signifier S’ as re-
presentation of the former signifier S does not comprehensively replace the 
former signifier S. The re-presentation is by means of as-if structure. S’ both 
“is” and “is not” S that S’ is similar to S, while S’ is different from S.  
The process can never be reduced to consciousness because a system of 
 
19 Ivi, p. 222. 
20 Id., Hermeneutics and Human Science, cit., p. 262. 
21 Id., Freud and Philosophy, cit., p. 150. 
22 Ivi, p. 134. 
23 Ivi, p. 122. 
24 Ivi, p. 404. 
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meaning is a linguistic system or a social system, which provides a contextual 
network of meaning. For example, In English linguistic system, the word 
“here” is meaningful if and only if it carries its significance through 
differentiating itself from other words like “there”, “that” and “this”. For 
another example, the word “being” is meaningful if and only if it carries its 
significance through differentiating itself from other words like “becoming”, 
“non-being” and “nothing”.25 It would be helpful to investigate a detail 
account of the dialectics in living metaphors. The dialectics in living 
metaphors consist of three steps26:  
1. A predicative assimilation / an assimilation to symbolic-mythic meaning  
2. Schematism/ re-enactment (producing a fictious image to the emerging 
meaning)  
3. Symbolism/ sympathetic imagination (suspending or negating the 
fictious image into the referential field)  
The first step of the predicate assimilation sets up the differences between 
two categories in a subject-predicate judgment. The predicate assimilation 
presupposes differences. For example, if I say, “this apple is a fruit”, then it 
is true that logically speaking, the extension of fruit includes an apple and the 
intension of an apple consists of a property, fruit. Nonetheless, it is also true 
that fruit is not identical to this apple. It means that this apple shares the 
similar description or logical intension of the meaning of fruit, but they are 
different. Fruit cannot exhaust the comprehensive meaning of this apple. This 
step aims at breaking the previous rules of categories. This step of rule-
breaking does not mean that the two categories are completely separated from 
each other. Instead, it distances the relationship between an apple and the fruit 
to referring to this apple itself. Through the first step, something is created 
and invented by “breaking rules”27.What does something refer to?  
His answer is a fictious image. The invention of fictious image is under 
the second step, namely the process of schematism, which is a method for 
constructing images. Ricœur gives a credit to the Kantian theory of 
schematism. In Kant’s transcendental philosophy, schematism is a method of 
giving an image to a concept. Schematism is a rule of producing images. A 
 
25 David Rasmussen, Mythic-Symbolism Language and Philosophical Anthropology, 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1971; Patrick Bourgeois, Extension of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic, 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1975; Alison S. Baumann, Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion, Continuum, York 2009. 
26 Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, Northwestern University Press, 




fictious image is a “faded perception” A faded perception does not mean it 
disappears or absence forever, but it means a comprehensive understanding 
of the image is inaccessible. For example, when I reflect upon this perceived 
apple, a fictious of this perceived apple appears. However, the fictious image 
of an apple is an ideal entity, which is not exactly the same as the material 
real apple perceived previously. It is absurd to claim that the material real 
apple perceived is inside my mind or brain. It follows that «the image is an 
emerging meaning»28. This image presents as a new ideal and meaningful 
invention after the breaking of the previous rules of categories. The third step 
is symbolism. This step intensifies the openness of the image, and further 
explains how the image is the renewal of the previous rules of categories. 
When we express the fictious image, the fictious image can be expressed by 
words, pictures, body gestures…etc. The means of expression are kinds of 
symbol. The symbol «is not really presented in pictorial, sound form, but is 
merely described»29. The symbol leads us to think of something by a 
consideration of something like it, and this is what constitutes the symbolic 
mode of signifying. It is the very meaning of the symbol. The symbol is not 
a copy or replica of absence, as it has no model or already given original to 
which it could be referred. It is unreal or irreal. Symbol contains an internal 
duality that at the same time the difference between the two old categories is 
overcome. It has three essential features: (1) resists any linguistic, semantic, 
or logical transcription, (2) is unbounded in any objective concepts or 
categories of the understanding, but (3) it hesitates on the dividing line 
between subjective feeling and objective concepts. It is noteworthy that a 
symbol is not a sign, as a symbol cannot be exhaustively treated by conceptual 
language. It is the name denoting the primordial rootedness in Life. The 
essential role of the symbol is to contain an internal duality that at the same 
time the relation of opposition is overcome.  
Through the dialectic in living metaphors, we formulate a judgment with 
the symbolic function, “seeing as”. Ricœur gives an example in 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, Time is a beggar30. If “beggar” means a 
person who asks for money to earn his living, and time means the temporal 
succession and becoming, then the two words “time” and “beggar” together 
do not make sense and ascribe objective validity. The two words “time” and 
“beggar” belongs to two different categories, namely something inanimate 
 
28 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1994, p. 122. 
29 Ivi, p. 223. 
30 Ivi, p. 211. 
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and something animate, respectively. Thus, there is a clash of category. Yet 
if we treat “time is a beggar” as a metaphorical judgment, this metaphorical 
judgment precisely means “time is seen as a beggar”. “Seeing as” joins both 
the “is” and “is not” in the sense that “is” includes “is not”. It sounds absurd 
and paradoxical. However, Ricœur explains that it is a transgressed outcome 
of a dialectical moment in Life, «Seeing X as Y’ encompasses “X is not Y”; 
seeing time as a beggar is, precisely, to know also that time is not a beggar. 
The borders of meaning are transgressed but not abolished»31.  
As a result, Ricœur does not limit himself to the investigation of the 
unconscious in the dimension of representation. Representation can never 
replace the origin of representation the unconscious in the language of force 
can avoid reductionism in two ways. Firstly, it can avoid reducing the 
unconscious to an object of exchange. The unconscious in the language of 
force refers to the subjective feeling or affect, which can never be 
comprehensively objectified. Secondly, the unconscious in the language of 
force cannot be comprehensively represented, but it can be somehow known 
through the representation. Ricœur gives a credit to Husserl’s later works that 
what is felt or affected in the pre-reflective level is already a presumed unity 
of meaning, as the process of meaning-constitution is devoted to «the 
signifying aspects of ante-predicative function»32. There is presumed unity of 
meaning before any linguistic representation. At the pre-reflective level, the 
non-objectifying (subjective) feeling or affect has no name. It has its name 
only after the second moment of the dialectics. At the reflective level, the 
non-objectifying (subjective) feeling or affect has its name, “the 
unconscious”. The psychoanalytic technique as hermeneutics functions as a 
philosophical reflective interpretation, through which experience is given a 
linguistic representation. His hermeneutic reading, indeed, is bound to 
representation, but Ricœur’s reading is a double reading that the unconscious 
reappears the unconscious in the language of force in and through the 
unconscious in the language of meaning. The unconscious is thus «in relation 
to consciousness: it is simply the attribute of what has disappeared, but can 
reappear»33.  
His double reading is a detour to the research of the origin of meaning, like 
Bernet’s phenomenological approach. The detour discloses not only the 
meaning constitution in the linguistic representation but also the meaning-
 
31 Ivi, p. 253. 
32 Ivi, p.  251. 
33 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, cit., p. 118. 
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constitution through the linguistic representation. Hence the detour is «more 
and more a “return from logic to the ante-predicative”, to the primordial 
evidence of the world»34. It is important to clarify what is the nature of the 
representation in Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation, in which linguistic 
representation is not taken for granted. He investigates the limit of linguistic 
representation through the hermeneutical moments in a living metaphor, and 
thereby he explicates that «the reference of linguistic order back to the 
structure of experience (which comes to language in the assertion) constitutes, 
in my view, the most important phenomenological presupposition of 
hermeneutics35». Language, word, and name are the reference of linguistic 
order back to one’s own experience. Ricœur would agree that no 
representation can exhaust the affects, the life and the existence themselves. 
It follows that his hermeneutics is called “critical hermeneutics” or 
“hermeneutic phenomenology”.  
 
 
Objections: Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is unfaithful to Freud  
When readers agree that Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation can defend 
itself from Henry’s criticism, some may find other objections. In this section, 
we look at some of the potential and influential objections to Ricœur’s 
interpretation. The objections we will consider are all general in scope (rather 
than objections that focus on specific notions or doctrines). Since my aim is 
to address the root causes that lead many philosophers to neglect Ricœur’s 
hermeneutic interpretation as a coherent and convincing framework for 
understanding Freud’s psychoanalysis, these general objections demand a 
response.  
Psychoanalytic readers often suppose that any philosophical reading of 
Freud somehow distorts the original project of Freud, we should not take it 
seriously. Laplanche appealed to the historical development of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis to argue that psychoanalysis is “anti-hermeneutical 
methodology”36. The analytical method is not in any sense a translation, a 
comprehension, or a reading. But rather, the method is better understood as 
“de-translation” in which no presupposition for re-translation is assumed. The 
symbolic method was only developed in the later editions of the 
 
34 Paul Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology, cit., p. 12. 
35 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Human Science, cit., p. 118. 




Traumdeutung. More importantly, according to Freud, the symbolic method 
and associative method are opposite instead of mutually supporting with each 
other. Unlike Ricœur’s interpretation, Freud, in the 1900 edition, found that 
when symbolism speaks, associations are silent.37 Taking a “man with a 
hatchet” as an example, a man who had been seriously ill for a year reported 
that when he was between eleven and thirteen he had repeatedly dreamt that 
a man with a hatchet was pursuing him; he tried to run away, but seemed to 
be paralyzed and could not move from the spot38. This is read as a typical 
scenario of castration, but Freud deliberately avoids using the notion of 
castration because “castration” should be silent when the dream is governed 
by symbolism. In other words, Freud avoids the use of associative method 
when the symbolic method functions in the analytic method.  
While this objection is widely assumed to be correct, it conceals the 
contribution of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation in a philosophical 
treading of Freud. Given that the dispute between phenomenological 
interpretation and hermeneutical interpretation is fundamentally about the 
methodological consideration that the unconscious can be originally and 
primordially given on the one hand; and it can be represented in the symbolic 
medium, on the other hand. Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation 
demonstrates how it can work without falling into the problem of 
representation and that of distortion. Since coherence and explanatory power 
serve as the essential criterion for the philosophical reading of Freud, some 
“revisions” or at least modifications are inevitably unavoidable. The case for 
Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is clearly built upon the deconstruction 
of psychoanalysis that tells in favor of the first-personal description based the 
phenomenological approach and the second-personal interpretation based on 
the hermeneutical approach. In this way, the vindication of Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation is nothing other than the vindication of the 
analytic method in Freud’s psychoanalysis. Therefore Macherey radically 
argued that Ricœur did not pretend to supplement Freud, but the 
understanding of Freud is to understand Ricœur himself39.  
Methodologically speaking, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation 
particularly illuminate what are not yet thematized in Freud’s psychoanalysis, 
 
37 Ivi, p. 8. 
38 Sigmund Freud, On Creativity and The Unconscious, Harper & Row Publisher, NY 1958, 
p. 584. 
39 Pierre Macherey, Une approche phénoménologique de la psychanalyse? Ricoeur lecteur 
de Freud. La Philosophie au Sens Large, 11 juin 2010; accessed on 13 April 2021, 1:55 pm 
(HKT), https://philolarge.hypotheses.org/595 16 
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namely a set of concerns about consciousness, self-consciousness, and 
intersubjectivity that Freudianism does not adequately illuminate. Even 
though Bernstein has so much sympathetic to Ricœur’s interpretation, he did 
not think Ricœur has achieved his aim to explain how the dialectic between 
the conscious and the unconscious is to be developed40. The doctrine of 
“transformation” or “translation”, in my view, contributes to Ricœur’s aim.1 
Ricœur’s doctrine of “transformation” or “translation” is faithful to Freud 
outline of transference which serves as a unique and productive contribution 
to a critical-practical understanding. Now it is undeniable that Ricœur built a 
bridge for the symbolic method and the associative method in his doctrine of 
“transformation” or “translation”. For example, a man with a hatchet gave his 
symbolic description in the dream, the psychoanalyst can give clues for the 
patient to associate with the hidden meaning curtailed behind the symbolism. 
As I suggested above, by tightly linking the symbolism to the association, 
Freud’s analytic method may be more coherent as a systematic whole. 
Similarly, the intertwining of the conscious and the unconscious may also be 
illuminated owing to the meaning-constitution that are inseparable and 
irreducible to each other. Consideration of the methodological contribution 
would not dissolve the destruction of Freud’s psychoanalysis in Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation, but such a destruction is a stepping-stone for the 
deconstruction of Freud’s psychoanalysis.  
1 Ricœur’s doctrine of “transformation” or “translation” is faithful to 
Freud outline of transference which serves as a unique and productive 
contribution to a critical-practical understanding.  
 
 
Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is a copy of Lacan’s interpretation  
When Ricœur published An Essay on Freud in 1965. He was greatly attacked 
by Lacanians that he plagiarized Lacan’s idea, or at least, he made no credit 
to Lacan’s interpretation. Elisabeth Roudinesco’s formulation in her 
biography of Lacan that «we know that the publication of this book injured 
the master: Ricœur, in fact, devoted an entire book to Freud and his disciples 
regardless of Lacan's teaching, which he had attended the seminary five 
years»41. Besides, André Schlemmer shared the same accusation to Ricœur. 
Many scholars took it for granted that Lacan must be the founder who 
thematized the role of language in the symbolism of Freud’s psychoanalysis. 
 
40 Richard Bernstein, Ricoeur’s Freud, “Ricoeur Studies”, vol. 4, n. 1 (2013), p. 138. 
41  E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan, Paris, Fayard, 1993, p. 423. 
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As for Lacan being the “default founder” in any philosophical reading of 
Freud, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation seems to be nothing new and 
original.  
However, several scholars try to defend Ricœur from the historical fact 
and the comparison between the two philosophical readings. 
 
Thanks to Fonds Ricœur, the manuscript of Ricœur’s Bonneval lecture, 
given on 2 November 1960 demonstrates that Ricœur was correct and honest 
in saying that his own interpretation is prior of his contact with Lacan. Some 
may still argue that Ricœur did attend Lacan’s seminar, and most probably, 
Ricœur’s interpretation can already be found in Lacan’s seminar. This 
accusation is thought to exhibit a kind of theoretical laziness in that it merely 
postulates a contingent and potential effect as a necessary and real fact. Rather 
than carefully comparing and explaining the similarities and differences 
between the two, the charge is just that by standing in opposition any 
hermeneutical (philosophical) reading other than Lacan, Ricœur is thought to 
be a plagiarist.  
Karl Simms made a substantial contribution to a detailed analysis of the 
confrontation between Ricœur and Lacan, especially, his chapter 3 and 4 on 
their interpretation of the unconscious42. This paper is greatly inspired by his 
work. However, due to the interest and scope, Simms did not discuss or even 
mention Henry’s criticism.  
 
 
Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is outdated  
The accusation of theoretical laziness displays an unfamiliarity of Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation and Lacan’s interpretation. One of the very 
differences between Ricœur’s interpretation and Lacan’s interpretation is that 
Lacan put too much emphasis on language and ignore the desired subject who 
ontologically grounds the project of psychoanalysis43. Busacchi made a 
substantial contribution to the difference. For Lacan, the unconscious is not 
individual because it is transindividual, that is not at the disposal of the subject 
in re-establishing the continuity of his conscious discourse. For Ricœur, the 
 
42 Karl Simms, Ricoeur and Lacan, Continuum, York 2007, pp. 33-68. 
43 Fabien Lamouche, Herméneutique et psychanalyse. Ricoeur lecteur de Freud, “ESPRIT”, 





unconscious has two dimensions, namely, the unconscious in the dimension 
of life and the unconscious in the linguistic dimension. The unconscious 
refers to the individual life and has transindividual meaning. Moreover, as we 
noted earlier, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is critical hermeneutics 
or phenomenological hermeneutics. It is influences by Husserl’s 
phenomenology, especially his intentional analysis, which had not too much 
affected Lacan’s interpretation. These are surely required a comparative study 
that can specified in more detailed because both undoubtedly have several 
similar accounts. Perhaps Lacan’s influence played much more significant 
role in Ricœur’s interpretation of Freud and in his philosophical use of 
psychoanalysis than had a contingent effect of some temporal factual and 
provisional causes44.  
Even in philosophical discourses of Freud, Ricœur’s interpretation of 
Freud receives less attention, comparing to Lacan’s interpretation. For 
instance, in Reading Freud: Psychoanalysis through Philosophy edited by Jon 
Mills, Lacan was mentioned more than times by several scholars in their main 
paragraph, whereas Ricœur was mentioned 1 time in the preface. Worse still, 
The Cambridge Companion to Freud and The Analytic Freud: Philosophy and 
Psychoanalysis did not even mention Ricœur. Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
interpretation seems to be outdated.  
Still, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation brings some important lesson 
to us in both theoretical and methodological perspectives. From the 
methodological perspective, phenomenology and hermeneutics are not 
mutually exclusive but reconcilable. Henry emphasized that the language of 
meaning cannot exhaust the meaning of force or the non-objectifying feeling 
or affect, e.g., suffering. Suffering is revealed itself and affected itself in a 
passive dimension when they are under enduring. Ricœur recognized and 
appreciated Henry’s attempts that «only the work of Michel Henry do we find 
this phenomenology practiced»45. However, Ricœur disagreed that the 
account of revelation or affect cannot get rid of the system of meaning and 
language. As he stated, «phenomenology does give an understanding of 
psychoanalysis, but only through approximation and by way of diminishing 
differences» because phenomenology is a reflexive discipline, but 
psychoanalysis is not46. The phenomenological method operates the 
 
44 Vinicio Busacchi, Lacan’s Epistemic Role in Ricoeur’s Re-Reading of Freud, “Ricoeur 
Studies”, vol. 7, n. 1 (2016), pp. 56-71. 
45 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, cit., p. 328. 
46 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, cit., p. 390. 
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displacement of reflection, but both hermeneutics and psychoanalysis operate 
an archeological excavation. In this way, phenomenology itself can never 
reach the hidden meaning of surface appearance. Ricœur took repression as 
an example, «repression is a real exclusion which a phenomenology of the 
implicit or co-intended can never reach»47. Numerous repressed memories are 
constituted and become “traumas” only after the event through assigning a 
name with an explanation to them. The attempt to reformulate psychoanalysis 
“in terms of phenomenology, have failed” if hermeneutics is dismissed48. 
Psychoanalysis requires an account or narration, so «all truth claims of 
psychoanalysis are ultimately summed up in the narrative structure of 
psychoanalysis facts»49. Returning to the account of suffering, Ricœur 
pointed out that,  
 
we must go further and take into account more deeply concealed forms 
of suffering: the incapacity to tell a story, the refusal to recount, the 
insistence of the untellable…which can be made meaningful through 
the strategy of employment50. 
 
Since suffering is «the after-the-event phenomenon (Nachträglichkeit) 
Ricœur»51,  
 
the meaning of suffering is hidden behind. The hidden meaning can be 
constituted only through the selection of a subject’s experience into a 
story or narrative. It is because the partial explanatory segments of this 
or that fragment of behaviour are integrated in a narrative structure, 
rather than just certain isolated events. With a narrative structure, 
fragment of behaviour become capable of forming meaningful 
sequences and ordered connections52. 
 
In this way, we can this uncover the deeply concealed forms of suffering.  
Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenology can reconcile both phenomenology 
and hermeneutics. Psychoanalysis and hermeneutics move forward 
phenomenology with linguistic articulation, so that phenomenology can have 
 
47 Ivi, p. 392. 
48 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Human Science, cit., p. 417. 
49 Ivi, p. 268. 
50 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, cit., p. 320. 
51 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Human Science, cit., p. 254. 
52 Ivi, p. 253. 
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a theory of expression and interpretation of its constitutional moment. 
Hermeneutics offers an analysis of the system of meaning and language. 
Consequently, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation is necessary to provide 
a theory of constitution and interpretation for both phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis. The phenomenological reading of psychoanalysis and the 




I have argued that Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation offers a highly 
promising framework for the translation of the unconscious in 
psychoanalysis. It can defend itself from Henry’s criticism, as illustrated by 
the two key clarifications, namely, the twofold language argument and the 
non-reductionist argument that contributes to an inference to the best 
explanation in favour of Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation. I have also 
seen that the objections that are basically thought to impugn Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation distorting Freud, stealing Lacan’s idea and 
obsolete, and that, given the refutation that Ricœur’s hermeneutical 
interpretation is an original deconstruction of Freud without abandoning the 
lesson of phenomenology, Ricœur’s hermeneutical interpretation regarding 
its philosophical contribution is highly valid in reconciling phenomenology 
and hermeneutics.  
Eoin Carney has remarked that Ricœur’s hermeneutical readings of Freud 
works with, and through, the pre-given material found in analysand’s concrete 
life history and self-understanding. It does not aim to nullify or 
demythologize the unconscious, but rather to situate it on a more appropriate 
plane of understanding, through which they become unmasked. For example, 
psychoanalytic technique remains distinctive from practical concerns with 
meaning, but is fundamentally bound to the symbolic, lived experience of the 
psychoanalytic procedure of investigation53. As Carney pointed out, Ricœur’s 
hermeneutical interpretation shows how the dialectics of the unconscious 
through the linguistic representation is possible. There are three important 
procedures here that go a detour way toward explaining the hidden meaning: 
(1) desymbolization, (2) demythotizification and (3) resymbolization. The 
detour of a rediscovery processes two moments of dialectics: understanding 
and explanation. Phenomenology is a regressive understanding of the 
 
53 Eoin Carney, Technique and Understanding: Paul Ricoeur on Freud and the Analytic 
Experience, “Ricoeur Studies”, vol. 7, n. 1 (2016), p. 98. 
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meaning, which consists of (1) and (2). Hermeneutics is a study of progressive 
explanation of the meaning, which consists of (3). Thus, psychoanalysis is 
not phenomenology. Instead, it is a paradigm of hermeneutics in virtue of the 
explanatory force linked to the “reconstruction” of the “primitive sense”. In 
other words, «”to understand” what of the symptom, it is necessary to 
“explain” its why»54. It just may be unavoidable to have hermeneutical 









54 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and Human Science, cit., p. 85. 
